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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Rachael Louise Meyer appeals from the judgment entered

Meyer

guilty of trafﬁcking heroin.

two 0f the

suppress,

after a jury

found her

challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to

district court’s evidentiary rulings,

and the sentence imposed by the

district court.

Statement

On

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

April 16, 2017, Ofﬁcer Claiborn with the Boise Police Department stopped a

black Ford Mustang for failing t0 use a turn signal. (R., p.88.) Rachael Louise

Meyer was

a passenger in the Mustang. (R., p.88.) The driver of the Mustang admitted that he failed
to signal

and consented

to a search ofhis car. (R., p.88.)

Ofﬁcer Green, a canine ofﬁcer, asked the driver and Meyer

Mustang so he could run his drug dog around the

car.

and the driver got out of the Mustang and stood next
he ﬁlled out a

citation.

(T12, p.12, Ls.1 1-15.)

get a lighter out 0f her purse.

lighter, again,

EX. 5

a lot

Meyer

EX. 5 at 0:14-0:16.)

said,

“okay,

5 at 0:16-0:18.)

and brought

it

of the

(TL, p.25, Ls. 14-2 1; R., p.88.)

Meyer

to

Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s patrol car while

Meyer asked Ofﬁcer Claibom
Ofﬁcer Claiborn

ofwomen carry knives in their purse.

at 0:08-02 13.)

Meyer

(R., pp.88-89.)

t0 get out

asked, “so if you search

I’ll

get

it

for you,”

and

started

t0 the

hood 0f his

said, “well, if

she could

you grab a

can do a quick search.” (State’s

then

Ofﬁcer Claiborn responded, “yeah.”

Ofﬁcer Claibom told Meyer

back

it,

I

if

I

can have a lighter?” (State’s
(State’s EX. 5 at 0:16-0:17.)

walking toward the purse. (State’s EX.

t0 stay

by

the car, retrieved Meyer’s purse,

patrol car. (State’s EX. 5 at 0:18-0:36.)

After setting Meyer’s purse 0n the hood of his car, Ofﬁcer Claiborn

its size:

“This

is

a suitcase.”

(State’s EX. 5 at 0:35-0:38.)

He

of a golf ball) inside a zebra print bag inside [Meyer]’s purse.”

and placed her

in the

m

back of his patrol

Ofﬁcer Claiborn read Meyer her
Ofﬁcer Claiborn recommended

that

Meyer told Ofﬁcer Claibom:

4:28.)

Meyer

“I

car.

conversation,

lot

honest.

(State’s EX.

police

Meyer

state

“either she can

work

as an

Later in the

her. (State’s EX. 18 at 9:

1

5-9240.)

at six

Meyer
L.1.)

eventually confessed that the heroin

grams. (State’s EX. 18

into custody,

Meyer admitted

would ﬁnd her ﬁngerprints on the bag 0f heroin.
The

mean

she wanted t0 talk t0 a detective, she needed t0 be

belonged to her and estimated the weight

Montoya. (TL, p.388, L.18 — p.390,

Meyer

could help you out beyond your belief” (State’s EX.

18 at 9:40-10:08.)

After Ofﬁcer Claiborn took

put

(State’s EX. 18 at 4:16-

of drug information” (TL, p.375, Ls.5-21).

that, if

He

(State’s EX. 18 at 2:35-3:10.)

talk to a detective.

Meyer denied that the heroin belonged t0

Ofﬁcer Claiborn told Meyer

(R., p.89.)

(the size

(Tr., p.3 19, Ls.5-8.)

rights.

18 at 4:53-4:56), Which Ofﬁcer Claiborn understood t0

informant or provide a

then searched the purse.

Ofﬁcer Claibom “located a large amount of heroin

(State’s EX. 5 at 0:39-2:34.)

in handcuffs

commented on

(Tr.,

charged Meyer with trafﬁcking heroin.

at 11:38-12: 12.)

Meyer spoke With Detective
to Detective

Montoya

that the

p.390, Ls.2-9; State’s EX. 16.)

(R., pp.25-26.)

Meyer moved t0

suppress the heroin on the basis that “the search of the small cloth bag illegally exceeded
the scope 0f consent

Ms. Meyer granted

t0 search her purse for

weapons.”

(R., pp.41-42.)

After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court found “[a] typical reasonable

person would have understood the exchange between Ofﬁcer Claiborn and [Meyer] as

giving unqualiﬁed consent t0 search [Meyer] ’s purse, including the zebra print bag inside

her purse” and thus denied Meyer’s motion. (R., p.92.)
Prior to

the state

trial,

moved to preclude Meyer from asking Ofﬁcer Claiborn about

methamphetamine that was found in his patrol car at the time 0f Meyer’s

Meyer argued

Ls.8-23.)

arrest.

the testimony “should be presented t0 the jury as

it

(TL, p. 143,

goes t0 the

weight and credibility of Ofﬁcer Claibom and his performance as a law enforcement

Meyer thought

ofﬁcer.” (Tr., p.144, Ls.18-24.) Speciﬁcally,

he followed standard operating procedures in securing
stop.”

The

(TL, p. 144, Ls. 1 8-24.)

district

illicit

it

went

to “[w]hether or not

substances from any previous

court found the testimony about the

methamphetamine had only “minimal relevance” and that having a mini-trial “about whose
methamphetamine

L23 —

p. 147,

it

was

.

.

.

would

The

L23.)

constitute an unnecessary waste 0f time.” (Tr., p. 146,

district

excluded any testimony regarding the

court

methamphetamine. (TL, p.147, Ls.15-23.)
Also prior to

Meyer

trial,

objected to the state introducing ﬁve cell phones and

approximately $3,000 in cash found in Meyer’s purse 0n the bases that those items were
“not relevant to whether 0r not she possessed 19 grams ofheroin” and constituted “404(B)”
evidence. (TL, p.104, L.18

because

“[i]t’s

— p.105,

L.16.)

The

district court

overruled Meyer’s objection

not 404(B) bad act kind 0f stuff” but “just a plain 401, 402, 403 analysis”

and the money and

cell

phones were “relevant to the question 0f knowledge and control 0r

intent to control.” (TL, p.1 16, Ls.16-23, p.132, Ls.3-8.)

The case proceeded
asked the

district

methamphetamine

t0

trial.

(R., pp.167-83.)

court t0 reconsider

left in

its

Ofﬁcer Claibom’s

After the second day 0f trial,

Meyer

decision to exclude testimony about the

car.

(TL, p.458, L.10

— p.465,

L.4.)

The

district court

denied the motion “based on 403” because “this methamphetamine issue

just is a waste of time

and creates unnecessary conﬁlsion.”

The jury found Meyer

guilty 0f trafﬁcking heroin.

(T12,

appealed. (R., pp.245-49.)

.

.

p.466, Ls. 12-17.)

(R., p.226.)

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of twenty years with ten years ﬁxed.

.

The

(R., p.235.)

district court

Meyer timely

ISSUES
Meyer

Did

I.

0n appeal

states the issues

as:

the district court err in denying

Ms. Meyer’s motion

t0

suppress?

Did the district court abuse its discretion in prohibiting Ms. Meyer
from introducing at trial evidence of the methamphetamine found in
the back 0f Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s patrol car?

II.

Did

III.

the district court err in permitting the State t0 introduce at

evidence of the

Did the

IV.

cell

trial

phones and cash found in Ms. Meyer’s purse?

district court

abuse

its

discretion at sentencing?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Meyer

failed to

show

the district court erred

When

it

denied her motion t0

suppress?

II.

Has Meyer failed to show the district court abused its discretion by prohibiting
Meyer from introducing the methamphetamine found in Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s
patrol car?

III.

IV.

Has Meyer

failed to

introduce at

trial

Has Meyer

show

the district court erred

by permitting

the state to

evidence 0f cell phones and cash found in Meyer’s purse?

failed to

show

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion?

ARGUMENT
I.

The
A.

District

BV Denying Meyer’s Motion To

Court Did Not Err

Suppress

Introduction

The
found,

district court

properly denied Meyer’s motion to suppress.

Meyer gave unqualiﬁed consent

t0 search her purse

When

As the

district court

she offered t0 get her

purse for Ofﬁcer Claiborn after Ofﬁcer Claibom conﬁrmed that “if [he] search[ed]
[she] [could]

have a

lighter.” (State’s EX. 5 at 0:14-0:17.)

Even

limited her consent t0 a search for knives, Ofﬁcer Claiborn

Amendment because he conformed his
at the

if,

as

Meyer

it,

then

suggests, she

still

did not Violate the Fourth

search t0 that limitation.

The undisputed evidence

suppression hearing showed that the bag in which Ofﬁcer Claiborn found the heroin

could hold a “card knife,” “[p]0cket knife,

Standard

B.

[or]

razor blade.” (TL, p.16, L.23

— p.17,

L.19.)

Of Review

This Court reviews a

district court’s

order resolving a motion to suppress “using a

bifurcated standard of review.” State V. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567

(2016).

“This Court accepts the

erroneous, but

light

is

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless they are clearly

may freely review the trial

ofthose facts.”

a ﬁnding of fact.

(Ct.

trial

I_d.

court’s application 0f constitutional principles in

A district court’s ﬁnding as t0 the scope of an individual’s consent

E, gg, State V. Harwood,

133 Idaho 50, 52, 981 P.2d 1160, 1162

App. 1999) (“[T]he temporal scope of a consent

be made based upon the

totality

to search is a factual determination t0

0f the circumstances.”).

Ofﬁcer Claiborn Did Not Violate The Fourth Amendment Because Meyer Gave
Him Consent To Search Her Purse

C.

Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s search of Meyer’s purse did not Violate the Fourth Amendment
because Meyer consented t0 the search.

Consent

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.
3 16,

“The United

319 (2016).

searches because

SO.’”

I_d.

Supreme Court has ‘long approved consensual

upon

is

consent, the state

the right granted

by

585, 401 P.3d 581, 585 (Ct. App. 2017).
suspect’s consent under the Fourth

would

State V. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 265, 371 P.3d

m,

conduct a search once they have

must conform

search t0 the

its

the consent.” State V. Greub, 162 Idaho 581,

“The standard

for measuring the scope 0f a

Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what

the typical reasonable person have understood

and the suspect?”

t0

(quoting Florida V. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991)).

the basis for a search

limitations placed

a well-recognized exception t0 the

n0 doubt reasonable for the police

it is

been permitted t0 d0

“[W]hen

States

is

500 U.S.

at

by the exchange between

the ofﬁcer

25 1.

Here, substantial evidence supported the district court’s ﬁnding that “[a] typical

reasonable person would have understood the exchange between Ofﬁcer Claiborn and

[Meyer] as giving unqualiﬁed consent t0 search [Meyer] ’s purse, including the zebra print

bag inside the purse.”
obj ect he

(R., p.92.)

would search

for,

While Ofﬁcer Claiborn used knives

as an

example 0f an

he did not limit his request t0 search Meyer’s purse to knives.

(TL, p.13, Ls.17—22.) Instead, he told

Meyer that,

if

she wanted a lighter out of her purse,

he would have t0 “d0 a quick search” of her purse. (State’s EX. 5

at 0:12-0:13.)

With no

mention 0f knives 0r weapons, Meyer clariﬁed Ofﬁcer Claibom’s request by asking, “if

you search

it,

then

I

can have a lighter?” (State’s EX. 5

responded, “yeah,” and

Meyer consented without

at 0:14-0:16.)

qualiﬁcation: “okay,

Ofﬁcer Claiborn

I’ll

get

it

for you.”

(State’s EX. 5 at 0: 15-0217.)

factual

ﬁnding

that

is

substantial evidence that supports the district court’s

Meyer gave Ofﬁcer Claiborn unqualiﬁed consent to

Meyer points
Meyer consented

That

t0

Ofﬁcer Claibom’s testimony

to a search

22.)

suppression hearing that “Ms.

of her purse t0 ‘make sure there were no knives in

(Appellant’s brief, p.6 (quoting Tr., p.13, Ls.3-10).)

also testiﬁed that

at the

search her purse.

As

it.”’

a factual matter, Ofﬁcer Claiborn

he understood Meyer’s consent to cover “any weapon.” (TL,

p.

1

3, Ls.

1

7-

But more importantly, as a legal matter, Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s subjective understanding

0f the scope of Meyer’s consent

“is

of n0 import” because “[t]he scope of consent

determined by an obj ective reasonableness standard.” State

975 P.2d 1187, 1189
In

all

(Ct.

132 Idaho 522, 524,

App. 1999).

events, even if

court did not err

V. Frizzel,

is

Meyer

limited her consent to a search for knives, the district

by denying Meyer’s motion

to suppress

Claiborn conformed his search to that limitation.

because the record shows Ofﬁcer

E, gg,

m,

500 U.S.

at

251-52

(holding consent to search car for drugs included consent t0 search any containers within
the vehicle that might contain drugs);

Giub, 162 Idaho

she consented t0 a search ofher vehicle for ‘anything
for the ofﬁcer to believe

at

586, 401 P.3d at 586

illegal,’

it

was

(“When

obj ectively reasonable

he could search any containers within the vehicle

.

.

.

Which might

contain alcohol 0r drugs.”). Ofﬁcer Claiborn expressly testiﬁed at the suppression hearing
that the zebra print

bag

in

which he found the heroin could hold a “card knife,” “[p]0cket

knife, [0r] razor blade.” (T12, p.16, L.23

— p.17,

L.19.) Because

Meyer concedes

that she

consented to a search 0f her purse for knives and the only evidence in the record shows the
zebra print bag in which she kept the heroin could have held a knife, Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s

search 0f the zebra print bag in Meyer’s purse conformed to Meyer’s consent and thus did

not Violate the Fourth

Amendment.

II.

The

District

Court Did Not Abuse

Methamphetamine
A.

Its

In

Discretion

BV Excluding Evidence Of The

Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s Patrol Car

Introduction

The

district court

properly excluded evidence of the methamphetamine found in

Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s patrol car because

had, at most, minimal relevance and posed a

it

signiﬁcant danger 0f wasting time and confusing the jury.

cleaned his patrol car before arresting
heroin.

And introducing

resulted in a mini

Whether Ofﬁcer Claiborn

Meyer had no bearing 0n whether Meyer trafﬁcked

evidence 0f an unrelated illegal substance to the jury would have

trial to

determine

who owned

the

methamphetamine and whether

it

belonged to Meyer.

Meyer argues evidence 0f
diligence and credibility.

the

methamphetamine went

But Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s alleged

before starting his shift does not

mean Ofﬁcer Claiborn

t0

Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s

failure to clean his patrol car

carelessly investigated Meyer’s

trafﬁcking of heroin and had n0 bearing 0n Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s credibility.

Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s diligence, 0r lack

thereof, does not

change the

heroin in her purse and confessed that the heroin belonged t0 her.

have t0 take Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s word as t0
Video, which

that evidence

facts that

And

Meyer had

the jury did not

because the jury saw his bodycam

showed Ofﬁcer Claiborn ﬁnding a bag of heroin

confessing that the heroin belonged t0 her.

Furthermore,

in

Meyer’s purse and Meyer

Standard

B.

Of Review

“In reviewing the

trial

of the evidence outweighs

court’s decision

its

.

.

.

concerning Whether the probative value

prejudicial impact, the standard 0f review

discretion.” State V. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 218, 16 P.3d 890,

abuse of

is

894 (2000).

The

District Court Properly Excluded The Methamphetamine Left In Ofﬁcer
Claibom’s Patrol Car

C.

The

district court

properly excluded evidence of the methamphetamine

Ofﬁcer Claibom’s patrol car as confusing and a waste of time. “The court
relevant evidence if

its

probative value

confusing the issues, misleading the jury,

methamphetamine had

little,

if any,

is

substantially

[or]

may

left in

exclude

outweighed by a danger 0f

.

.

.

wasting time.” I.R.E. 403. Evidence of the

probative value and posed a grave danger of confusing

the jury and wasting time.

The

fact that

methamphetamine had been

only “minimal relevance.”
“is

determined by

M,

its

(Tr., p. 146,

L.23

left in

— p. 147,

Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s car had,

L.8.)

p.513, L23.)

relationship to the legal theories presented

by

the parties.”

state

argued

Meyer argued

that she did not

admitted the heroin belonged to her.

Ofﬁcer Claiborn

prior t0 putting

at trial that

the heroin Ofﬁcer Claiborn found in Meyer’s purse. (TL, p.502, L.24

know

the heroin

was

in her purse

confessed t0 the crime because Ofﬁcer Claiborn told her that she could g0

that

m

The probative value of evidence

157 Idaho 89, 100-01, 334 P.3d 280, 291-92 (2014). The

Meyer possessed

at best,

(Tr., p.5 14,

L.6

— p.519,

into his patrol car has

contradicts the state’s theory that

ignorance.

10

home

from past

n0 probative value because

Meyer possessed heroin nor

and only
if

she

L.8.) Put simply, evidence

failed to thoroughly search his patrol car for drugs

Meyer

—

it

arrests

neither

supports Meyer’s defense 0f

Meyer argues
car

went

t0 his diligence

credibility

She

is

was

his diligence

and

and

credibility

that

central t0 the State’s case against

wrong 0n both
First,

of the methamphetamine in Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s patrol

that evidence

“Ofﬁcer Claibom’s diligence and

Ms. Meyer.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.10.)

counts.

Ofﬁcer Claibom’s alleged
and nothing about his

failure t0 clean out his patrol car said little about

credibility.

cleaning out his patrol car does not

show

Ofﬁcer Claibom’s lack 0f diligence

that

in

he acted carelessly in his unrelated

investigation of Meyer.

Indeed, the rules prohibit the admission of such evidence for the

purpose 0f pushing

dubious inference.

other act

is

this

m

I.R.E. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence 0f a[n]

not admissible to prove a person’s character in order t0

.

.

.

show that on a particular

occasion the person acted in accordance With the character.”).

Moreover, Ofﬁcer

Claibom’s alleged

his credibility.

Credibility,

failure to clean out his patrol car has

no bearing on

E

Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarv/credibilitv

(“the quality or

power 0f inspiring

belief”) (last accessed June 7, 2019).

did not, for example, try to hide that he

acknowledged

that

methamphetamine

possibility

at the

when

may have made
Meyer’s

Ofﬁcer Claiborn

a mistake but rather readily

counsel

asked

him

about

the

suppression hearing. (TL, p.36, Ls.6-8.)

Second, neither Ofﬁcer Claiborn’s diligence nor his credibility were central to the
state’s case.

As

t0 diligence,

Meyer

fails to

explain

how any

lack of diligence on Ofﬁcer

Claiborn’s part could have affected the outcome 0f the investigation.

example, a case in Which Ofﬁcer Claibom administered a
diligence to produce a sound result.

238, 247 (Ct. App. 2015)

(“[I]t is

C_f.

test that

This

required

some

State V. Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112, 121,

well established that a defendant

11

not, for

is

may

level 0f

357 P.3d

challenge a

breathalyzer insofar as

.

.

.

Whether the breath

it

measured the defendant’s breath alcohol concentration, including

test

was properly administered”). Regardless of how

diligently

Ofﬁcer Claiborn searched Meyer’s purse, her purse contained 17 grams 0f heroin.

As

t0 credibility, the jurors did not

could just watch his bodycam Video. The

testimony—him ﬁnding the heroin

heroin—were captured 0n
(State’s Exhibit 18.)

his

in

critical

In addition t0 having

events Ofﬁcer Claiborn described in his

Video, which the state presented to the jury.

contest that she

little

to her.

had heroin

(Lg,

Tr.,

in her purse or that she told

p.516, Ls.8-9, p.5 1 8, Ls.20-21.)

0r n0 probative value, evidence 0f the

Ofﬁcer Claibom’s car posed a signiﬁcant
trial

Ofﬁcer Claiborn because they

Meyer’s purse and Meyer claiming possession of the

bodycam

Ofﬁcer Claiborn the heroin belonged

“A

to believe

And the jury had no reason to disbelieve Ofﬁcer Claibom’s testimony

anyway because Meyer did not

in

have

risk

methamphetamine

of confusing the jury and wasting time.

should not stray far from the central issue of guilt 0r innocence of the defendant

into a full-scale investigation

of charges

.

.

against other persons.” State V.

.

131 Idaho 367, 371, 956 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Ct. App. 1998).

As

MacDonald,

the district court observed,

presenting evidence of the methamphetamine to the jury would have resulted in a mini

“about a[n]

[illegal]

questions “about

(Tr.,

substance that we’re not dealing with in this particular case” to answer

Whose methamphetamine

p.146, L.23

— p.147, L23, p.463,

it

was” and “Whether

Ls.7-18, p.465, L.12

evidence of the methamphetamine had limited,

if any,

—

it

was [Meyer’s] or

p.466, L.17.)

its

discretion

by excluding

the evidence.

12

not.”

Because

probative value and introducing the

evidence carried a signiﬁcant risk of confusing the jury and wasting time, the
did not abuse

trial

E

district court

MacDonald, 131 Idaho

at

371,

956 P.2d
a

at 13

1

8

(afﬁrming exclusion of evidence that “would have created a

‘trial

within

trial’”).

Even

if the district court

abused

Any

methamphetamine, the error was harmless.

Where the

state

P.3d 900, 903-04
(Ct.

(Ct.

state

prove Meyer possessed

had

heroin.

(R., p.213.)

21.)

t0

and the excluded evidence would

State V. Starr, 161 Idaho 345, 348-49,

in

guilt.

at least

The Videos played

amount ofheroin

0:45), that

16).

guilt

385

App. 2016); State V. Santana, 135 Idaho 58, 64-66, 14 P.3d 378, 384-

ﬁrmly established Meyer’s

the state

that

the

App. 2000).

The

large

E

by excluding evidence 0f

error in excluding evidence is harmless

ﬁrmly established the defendant’s

not undercut the state’s theory 0f the case.

86

discretion

its

Meyer’s purse

To prove Meyer trafﬁcked

seven grams of heroin and

t0 the jury

showed

that

in heroin,

knew that

it

was

Ofﬁcer Claiborn found a

(State’s EX. 5 at 0:35-2:39; State’s EX. 18 at 0:01-

Meyer confessed the heroin belonged t0 her (State’s EX.

18 at

1

1:26-1 1:55), and

Meyer admitted the police would ﬁnd her ﬁngerprints 0n the bag of heroin (State’s EX.

And a lab technician testiﬁed that the heroin weighed
Any

reasonable juror

trafﬁcking heroin

who saw and

17.89 grams. (TL, p.423, Ls. 10-

heard that evidence would ﬁnd Meyer guilty 0f

by possessing more than seven grams of heroin.

Furthermore, the evidence of the methamphetamine would not undercut the state’s
theory of the case. Even if the jury heard that a bag of methamphetamine was
Claiborn’s car prior to Meyer’s arrest, that

would not change

13

Ofﬁcer

the content of the Videos

proving Meyer’s guilt or the weight 0f the heroin found in her purse.
excluding evidence of the methamphetamine was thus harmless.

left in

Any

error in

III.

The

A.

District

Its Discretion BV Admitting The
Money Found In Meyer’s Purse

Court Did Not Abuse

And

Cell Phones

Introduction

The

district court

properly admitted the cell phones and

because they were relevant t0 the trafﬁcking heroin charge.
heroin, the state

power and

had

to

money

in

Meyer’s purse

T0 prove Meyer trafﬁcked

prove that Meyer knew the heroin was in her purse and had the

intent to control the heroin.

The

cell

phones were relevant because, as Ofﬁcer

Claiborn and Detective Montoya both testiﬁed, individuals involved in trafﬁcking drugs
typically carry multiple cell phones,

makes

it

more

the heroin and

likely that she planned

had the power and

drug dog alerted t0 the

Which means Meyer’s possession 0f ﬁve
on

selling the heroin in her purse

intent to control

it.

cell

phones

and thus knew about

The money was relevant because a

money While performing a currency sniff, which made it more likely

that

Meyer’s money had come into contact with heroin and thus supported the

that

Meyer knew about

the heroin in her purse and

had the power and

state’s

theory

intent t0 sell the

heroin.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“‘[W]hether evidence
State V. Hall,

is

relevant

is

a matter of law that

163 Idaho 744, 774, 419 P.3d 1042,

is

subject t0 free review.”’

1072 (2018) (quoting State

V.

Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010)).

C.

The Cell Phones And Money Found In Meyer’s Purse Were Relevant T0 Her
Knowledge Of And Power And Intent To Control The Heroin
The

cell

phones and money found in Meyer’s purse were relevant

to the trafﬁcking

heroin charge. “To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.” State V. Koch, 157 Idaho

14

334 P.3d 280, 291 (2014)

89, 100,

‘any tendency t0

make the

existence of any fact that

of the action more probable 0r
(quoting I.R.E. 401).

less

“Whether a

legal theories presented

(citing I.R.E. 401, 402).

by the

probable than

would be Without

it

Here, the cell phones and

determined by

157 Idaho

money found

possession of the heroin. The state charged

in

is

at

the evidence.” Li.

its

relationship to the

100-01, 334 P.3d at 291-92.

Meyer’s purse were relevant

Meyer knew 0f the
The

p.215.)

by

state’s

the jury, proved

control

it.

cell

(T12,

— p.513,

power and

it

more

phones in her purse.

intent t0 control

ﬂ

Meyer was going

(TL, p.394, Ls.2-13.)

Tr.,

p.395, Ls.22-25.)

cell

power and

t0 sell the heroin.

commonly

intent to

state’s theory

Meyer had ﬁve

associated” with “drug sales.”

Meyer argues

that the state “presented

how

immediately deleted the text messages on

Claibom

ﬁrst stopped the black Ford Mustang. (State’s Ex. 17.)

all

0f her

cell

Meyer deleting

15

see.

the jury

phones When Ofﬁcer

phones were working and strongly suggests

phones contained text messages Meyer did not want the police to

n0

0r if they had been

Meyer admitted in a recording played t0

that she

cell

(R.,

Both Ofﬁcer Claiborn and Detective

phones were working, or

used.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.12- 1 3.) But

messages shows that the

it.

to sell the heroin, which, if believed

heroin’s presence and had the

testiﬁed that “multiple cell phones are

p.324, Ls.20-24;

had t0 prove

L.23.)

likely that

evidence regarding Whether the

text

state

phones and money found in Meyer’s purse supported the

because they made

Montoya

Meyer was going

Meyer knew 0f the

(TL, p.502, L.24

The

cell

heroin’s presence and had the

theory was that

t0 her

Meyer with trafﬁcking heroin by possessing

seven grams or more of heroin. (R., pp.25-26.) T0 prove possession, the
that

relevant if it has

of consequence t0 the determination

is

fact is material is

parties.” K0_ch,

“Evidence

all

of her

that the cell

Meyer’s possession

0f ﬁve different

cell

phones and deletion of her text messages made

Meyer was planning 0n
argument

that

Meyer
p.325, L.8.)
sniff"

had $3,038 of cash

in a wallet inside

in

Meyer’s purse and alerted

cocaine, or heroin. (Tr., p.405, L. 14

— p.407,

wallet that smelled like drugs

made

and thus supported the

theory that

state’s

Meyer erroneously argues
the

it

more

L.

1

The

8.)

likely that

free t0

it.

dog did a “currency

fact that

of marijuana,

Meyer had $3,038

in her

selling drugs

selling the heroin in her purse.

not relevant because “she received

money from Western Union and had a receipt for it.”

was

that his

Meyer was involved in

money was

state’s

intent to control

to the presence

Meyer planned on

that the

likely that

of her purse. (TL, p.324, L.25 —

Ofﬁcer Canﬁeld, a drug dog handler, testiﬁed

on the money found

more

Which supported the

selling the heroin in her purse,

Meyer had knowledge 0f the heroin and the power and
also

it

present—and did present—that information

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

Meyer

to the jury (TL, p.399, Ls. 14-22),

but that does not cancel out the relevance 0f the money. The state did not argue that the
source of the

money showed Meyer was planning 0n

the drug dog’s alert

0n Meyer’s money made

selling heroin. (TL, p.51

1,

it

more

money had come

Even if the
purse, the error

district court erred

was harmless given

in the admission

overwhelming.

and had the power and

0f evidence

ﬂ

is

it

Meyer was planning on
alert,

the jury could

more

likely that

had

Meyer knew about

intent t0 sell the heroin.

by admitting the

the

argued instead that

into contact With heroin since she

from Western Union, Which would make

the heroin in her purse

likely that

L.25 — p.5 12, L.9.) Based on the drug dog’s

reasonably infer that Meyer’s
received

it

selling heroin but

cell

phones 0r the money in Meyer’s

overwhelming evidence against Meyer.

Any error

harmless where the properly admitted evidence 0f guilt

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261,

16

is

_, 429 P.3d 149, 161 (2018) (“[W]e

ﬁnd

that the admission

overwhelming evidence
II.C.,

0f Detective Berger’s testimony was harmless based on the
that Herrera shot [the Victim].”).

As explained

the state presented overwhelming evidence 0f Meyer’s guilt.

The

above,

state

ﬂ

Part

showed

the

jury Videos in which Ofﬁcer Claiborn found a large amount of heroin in Meyer’s purse
(State’s EX. 5 at 0:35-2:39; State’s EX. 18 at 0:01-0:45),

belonged t0 her (State’s EX. 18

at

11:26-1 1:55), and

ﬁnd her ﬁngerprints on the bag of heroin
0f Meyer’s

guilt.

ﬂ

State V.

as

it

(State’s EX. 16).

guilt

that the heroin

Meyer admitted that the
That

is

police

would

overwhelming evidence

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d

(ﬁnding overwhelming evidence 0f

which showed the incident

Meyer confessed

38,

44 (2017)

Where the jury “watched a Video 0f the events

unfolded”).

IV.

The
A.

District

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Meyer asserts
“a

15.)

Court Did Not Abuse

the sentence

imposed by the

district court is

m0ther[] With n0 signiﬁcant criminal history.”

The record supports

Standard

B.

When

excessive because she

is

(Appellant’s brief, p.14-

the sentence imposed.

Of Review

evaluating whether a sentence

is

excessive, the court considers the entire

length 0f the sentence under an abuse 0f discretion standard. State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State

V.

Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226

(2008).
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Meyer Has

C.

The

Failed

district court

To Show The
did not abuse

sentence With ten years ﬁxed.

District

its

discretion

presumed

It is

burden 0f demonstrating that

368 P.3d
sentence

if

it

at

is

628

it is

is

When

that the

the defendant’s probable term of conﬁnement.

P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

Court Abused
it

imposed a uniﬁed

To

thirty-year

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

be

Will

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the

a clear abuse 0f discretion.

(citations omitted).

Sentencing Discretion

Its

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

carry this burden the appellant must

excessive under any reasonable View 0f the facts.

I_d.

at 8,

show

the

A sentence is reasonable

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f protecting society and to

achieve any or
district court

all

of the related goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.

Li.

The

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them differing weights

When deciding upon the

sentence. Li. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State V. Moore, 131 Idaho 8 14,

825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding district court did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the obj ectives of punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society

outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference
substitute

its

at 8,

368 P.3d

at

m,

628 (quoting

226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence

ﬁxed Within the

ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion

1m,

Court Will not

View of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might

McIntosh, 160 Idaho
at

to the trial judge, this

146 Idaho

at

limits prescribed

by the

trial

differ.”

148-49, 191 P.3d

by the

m

statute Will

court.” Li. (quoting

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).

Not only does Meyer’s

maximum
Meyer’s

of

life in

sentence

prison,

is

the

ﬂ

thirty-year

I.C. §

uniﬁed sentence ﬁt within the statutory

37-2732B(a)(6)(D), the ten-year ﬁxed portion of

mandatory minimum under Idaho

18

law,

ﬂ

I.C.

§37-

Consequently, Meyer challenges only the twenty—year indeterminate

2732B(a)(6)(B).

portion of her sentence as an abuse of the district court’s discretion.

The

district court

It

was

not.

recognized the “four main obj ectives that the court must consider

in exercising its discretion in sentencing”: societal protection, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and retribution.

was “involved

And

(T12,

p.575, L.19

— p.576,

L.6.)

The

district court also

observed that Meyer

in distributing poisons that, frankly, destroy lives.” (TL, p.579, Ls.17-23.)

the district court noted that

Meyer had not been honest

throughout the proceedings, Which “caused

[it],

or forthright with the court

quite frankly, to doubt the credibility 0f

anything that the defendant had t0 say.” (TL, p.578, Ls.1-4.) Given these concerns and
the overall seriousness of the crime,

district court

did not abuse

its

which

carries a

sentencing discretion

minimum ten years ﬁxed and added twenty years
Meyer argues
court

knew

she

that the district court

was a

maximum penalty of life in prison,
When

it

imposed the mandatory

indeterminate.

abused

its

discretion because “[t]he district

mother[] With n0 signiﬁcant criminal history.”

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14- 1 5.) Meyer’s attempt to rely on her background t0

0f discretion

is

show an abuse

curious given her refusal t0 participate in the presentence investigation,

Which meant the

district court

did not have information about Meyer’s background:

The defendant completely refused

t0

cooperate or participate in the

presentence report or substance abuse evaluation.

Thus,

I

really

have n0

information regarding her background, education, family or marital or
children.

I

the

received n0 letters of support. Ihad n0 information as t0 the defendant’s

companions, alcohol or drug use, substance abuse
treatment, employment, physical or mental health, ﬁnancial, residential
activities,

interests,

information.

19

(TL, p.578, L.23
Virtually

— p.579, L.11 (paragraph break
all

the district court

added).)

knew about Meyer’s background was

a child and a criminal record—facts that d0 not require a

The

Ls.2-8; PSI, pp.5-6.)

came from

its

district court

that

more lenient sentence. (TL, p.579,

noted that most 0f

its

information about

observations during the criminal proceeding, Which

sentencing discretion

When

indeterminate for trafﬁcking

it

Meyer

showed “pounds and

pounds 0f [Meyer’s] dishonesty and apparent corruption.” (TL, p.579, Ls.1

0n the information available

Meyer had

1-23.)

to the district court, the district court did not

Based

abuse

its

imposed a sentence 0f ten years ﬁxed and twenty years

more than seven grams 0f heroin.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment entered after a jury

found Meyer guilty of trafﬁcking heroin.

DATED this

13th day 0f June, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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